The aim of this arti cle is to show that the New Insti tuti onal Economics is an interdisciplinary stream combining economics, law, organizati on theory, politi cal sciences, sociology, and anthropology.
I
The New Insti tuti onal Economics is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary fi eld combing economics, law, organizati on theory, politi cal sciences, sociology, and anthropology. It is helpful to "understand the insti tuti ons of social, politi cal and commercial life" (Klein, 1999, p. 456) . The founding father of the New Insti tuti onal Economics is Ronald Coase, who, in 1937 , wrote an arti cle enti tled "The nature of the fi rm". The term was coined by Olivier Williamson, who wanted to highlight the diff erences between the new economic ideas and the "old" insti tuti onal economics (Landreth & Colander, 2005) .
The "old" insti tuti onal economics is connected with Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell and John Commons. As Coase wrote (1998), they were of great intellectual stature but they were also anti -theoreti cal. Without a theory which bound together their ideas, they could not have succeeded (Coase, 1998, p. 72) . The Insti tuti onal Economics' style of presenti ng their ideas was very informal and rhetorical (Parada, 2002, p. 44) . The second reason why that theory is not very common is that "the old insti tuti onalism was parti ally disabled by both profound shift s in social sciences in the 1910-1940 period and of the rise of a mathemati cal style of neoclassical economics in the depression stricken 1930s" (Hodgson, 1998, p. 167 ).
There are many essenti al diff erences between the "new" and the "old" insti tuti onalism. The New Insti tuti onal Economics evades the holism of the older school (Klein, 1999, p. 457) . Insti tuti onal Economics' analysis is based mostly on formal insti tuti ons and the role of society in defi ning values (Parada, 2002, p. 45) , while the approach of the New Insti tuti onal Economics is more individualisti cthe point of departure is the individual itself. Insti tuti ons in this theory are originated from individual behaviour, through interacti on among individuals (Parada, 2002, p. 45) . According to North, they are "the humanly devised constraints that shape human acti on" (North, 1990, p. 3) . Insti tuti ons are constrained by the informal conditi ons like culture and custom, as well as formal conditi ons: law, property rights. "Insti tuti ons are the rules of the game in the economy, and 'organizati ons' ('the players of the game') arise in response to the insti tuti onal structure" (Ankarloo, 2006, p. 6) . The next diff erence is the role of rati onality. According to Insti tuti onal Economics, habits, norms and insti tuti ons play a signifi cant role in directi ng human behaviour without rejecti ng some rati onality in individual behaviour that is, however, constrained by economic and social environment (Parada, 2002, p. 45) . The New Insti tuti onal Economics introduces the idea of an individual not being a uti lity-maximizer but being subjected to bounded rati onality. According to Herbert Simon (1961), the individuals are "intendedly rati onal, but only limitedly so".
A signifi cant infl uence in the development of the New Insti tuti onal Economics has come from the following Nobel Laureates: Ronald Coase -the Nobel Prize in 1991, Herbert Simon -1978 , Olivier Williamson -2009 , Douglass North -1993 and James Buchanan -1986 . James Buchanan made a signifi cant contributi on to the development of the theory of public choice, whereas Herbert Simon focused on rati onality. The rest of the above-menti oned Nobel Laureates are discussed below.
This paper is to emphasize that the stream of the New Insti tuti onal Economics is not homogeneous. There are a few complementary theories being part of it: Agency Theory, Transacti on Costs Theory and Property Rights Theory. The other aim of this arti cle is to present basic assumpti ons of the main theories in the New Insti tuti onal Economics such as: Transacti on Costs Theory, Property Rights Theory and Agency Theory. Because of so many great economists who are interested in this economics stream, it is worth knowing the main building blocks. The third purpose of this paper is to present a short review of empirical studies connected with these theories.
As a review arti cle, it is organized as follows. First, there are presented Transacti on Costs with their basic assumpti ons. Next is Property Rights Theory and Agency Theory which are also presented with the most important assumpti ons. Then, a number of examples of empirical studies of these theories is presented. This part is a short review of research which brings theory into practi ce. The paper ends with conclusions.
T C
The founding father of this theory is Ronald Coase, who, in 1937 , wrote an arti cle enti tled "The nature of the Firm". Transacti on costs have become a very signifi cant category in Coasean economics. "Without them, many aspects of the functi oning of the economic system remain unexplained, including the emergence of the fi rm itself" "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Emilia Obińska-Wajda e new institutional economics -main theories (Parada, 2002, p. 50) .
Transacti on costs are the costs stemming from applying the price mechanism. In other words, these are the costs of negoti ati ng contracts, monitoring performance and getti ng to know trading partners (Parada, 2002, p. 50) . According to Kenneth Arrow (1969) , "transacti on costs are the costs of running the economic system". The Glossary of Industrial Organisati on Economics and Competi ti on Law states that these are the costs which are involved in market exchange-so these are the costs of "discovering market prices and the costs of drawing up and enforcing contracts" (Organisati on for Economic Co-operati on and Development [OECD], 1993) .
The sources of transacti on costs are: searching for informati on, analyzing opti ons, selecti ng a product, drawing up the contract and realizing it as well as the costs resulti ng from bounded knowledge and the tendency towards making mistakes (Chotkowski, 2010, p. 106 ).
According to Coase, "without taking into account transacti on costs it is impossible to understand properly the working of the economic system and have a sound basis for establishing economic policy" (Watkins) . Coase observed that the relati onships between companies are governed by the market prices while within the fi rms themselves, it is diff erent, that is, decisions are made on thorough entrepreneurial coordinati on, which is "a basis diff erent from maximizing profi t subject market prices" (Watkins) .
If the transacti ons are not managed by the price system, it must be done by the organisati ons themselves. The purpose of a business organisati on is to recreate the conditi ons of a competi ti ve market for producti on factors. Within the fi rm, this process should be run at a lower cost than the actual market (Watkins) . The entrepreneur can reduce transacti on costs by coordinati ng acti viti es related to contractual commitments by themselves. It is worth remembering that it is also part of another costs, coming from within, for example "problems of informati on fl ows, incenti ves, monitoring and performance evaluati on" (Klein, 1999, p. 464) .
In "The nature of the Firm" Coase raised the questi on of why there are any market transacti ons if the organisati ons can reduce the costs (Coase, 1937, p. 394) . He also menti oned the reasons why it is so. First of all, there is a connecti on between a fi rm's size and the costs of managing additi onal transacti ons. In larger organizati ons, the costs of managing additi onal transacti ons can be higher and "equated with the costs of additi onal market transacti ons" (Watkins) . The second reason menti oned by Coase (Coase, 1937, p. 394-395) is that "as the transacti ons which are organised increased, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of producti on in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of producti on".
The Coasean framework was developed and expanded by Olivier Williamson. It was Oliver Williamson who coined the term of "transacti on costs". According to him, transacti on costs appear when a service or goods are transferred through a technologically separate interface (Kowalska, 2005, p. 52) . The analysis of transacti on costs replaces the concentrati on of technology and producti on (or distributi on) costs by relying on the study of comparati ve costs of planning, adapti ng and supervising. These costs concern task accomplishment at diff erent structures of management (Kowalska, 2005, p. 52) .
Williamson defi nes a transacti on as a process in which goods or a service are transferred through a technologically separate interface. That defi niti on shows that the transacti on is not only a market exchange, but it covers all the exchange procedures within the organizati on (Kowalska 2005, p. 53) .
Williamson has been also the fi rst to have paid att enti on to a transacti on's dimensions which determine its specifi cati on and process. Those dimensions are: assets' specifi cati on, frequency and uncertainty (Kowalska 2005, p. 59) . It is worth menti oning that those dimensions have an infl uence on the level of transacti on costs: the increase in transacti ons' frequency decreases transacti on costs (Zbroińska, 2013, p. 165) ; the more asset specifi cati on, the higher transacti on costs (Kowalska, 2005, p. 59) .
P R
Property rights enti tle the owner of an asset to a number of "privileges", including the rights of use, benefi t and exclusion of others from them (Segal & Whinston, 2010) . It gives the owner of those rights a freedom to transfer them to others.
As far as an asset is concerned, property rights are "defi ned as a bundle of decision rights involving the asset (also called enti tlements in legal terms), which provide rights to take certain acti ons ("rights of access") and to prevent others from taking certain acti ons ("rights of "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Emilia Obińska-Wajda e new institutional economics -main theories exclusion"), including the right to take the profi t generated by use of the asset and to prevent others from doing so, oft en called "profi t rights" or "cash fl ow rights" in the literature" (Segal & Whinston, 2010) .
For Demsetz (1967) , "property rights convey the right to benefi t or harm oneself or others"., which means that it is prohibited to use fi rearms against a competi tor, but harming them by the producti on of a superior product is not; it may be permitt ed to benefi t by using fi rearms against an intruder but it is prohibited to benefi t by selling below a fl oor price (Demsetz, 1967, p. 347) . Therefore, the property rights show how one can benefi t or harm and who should pay to whom to alter the acti ons taken by an individual.
They are four characteristi cs of property rights (http://cmbc.ucsd.edu/content/1/docs/PROPERTY%20 RIGHTS.ppt): 1) universality: property rights can be held by individuals, state, groups; the enti tlements should be completely specifi ed and enforced, 2) exclusivity: all benefi ts and costs are for the owner; this characteristi c is concerned with durability, which is a durati on of these rights (a length of the enti tlement),
3) transferability: all property rights can be transferred from one owner to another in a voluntary exchange; transferability is connected with divisibility, 4) security: property rights should be secured from a seizure.
Property rights can be held by individuals, groups and state. Property rights held by individuals are private property rights; by groups are collecti ve property rights; by state-it is an extended form of collecti ve rights (Libecap, 1986, p. 235 ).
There is a close relati on between property rights and externaliti es. One of the property rights' functi on is achieving greater internalizati on of externaliti es by guiding the incenti ves. A potenti al externality can be every cost and benefi t which is associated with social interdependencies (Demsetz, 1967, p. 348) . It is necessary that "the cost of a transacti on in the rights between the parti es (internalizati on) must exceed the gains from internalizati on" (Demsetz, 1967, p. 348) . It means that the transacti on costs can be large because of diffi culti es in trading and legal reasons (Demsetz, 1967, p. 348) .
Property rights theory assumes that the producti on or consumpti on of a service or goods impacts market parti cipants, that is, there are externaliti es in each economy. According to this theory, owing to the internalizati on of externaliti es, the range of unexchangeable relati ons can be reduced. The main task of the government should be ensuring the accurate division of property rights. Internalizati on is connected with transacti on costs because, for example, securing of property rights has a price (Gorynia, 1999, p. 783) . Douglas North observed that the eff ecti veness of informal rules can be complemented and increased by formal rules. Within the formal rules themselves there are disti nguished the following: politi cal and judicial rules, economic rules and contracts. "Formal rules also may be enacted to modify, revise, or replace informal constraints" (Mahoney, 2005, p. 125) .
Property rights are defi ned by economic rules. Politi cal decision making specifi es and enforces property rights. The politi cal structure is infl uenced by the structure of economic interests. Property rights theory, as a simple functi on of changes in economic costs and economic benefi ts, is not widely popularised in the economic literature. According to North, this theory needs to be modifi ed "to account for the obvious persistence of ineffi cient property rights" (Mahoney, 2005, p. 125) .
A T
Agency Theory is very helpful in understanding the relati on between employers and employees, owners and managers or buyers and suppliers (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60) . The most important idea this theory is premised on is the agency relati onship that involves two parti es: the principal and the agent. The principal delegates work to the agent whose role is to perform it (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) defi ne the agency relati onship as a contract under which the principal engages the agent to perform some services on their behalf. This leads the principal to delegate some decision making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . The agent receives grati fi cati on for their performance as long as it is consistent with the principal's interest. On the other hand, there is opportunism in the agency relati onship, that is both parti es of this relati onship have diff erent aims and risk preferences (Gorynia, 1999, p. 779) .
If the principal and the agent are uti lity maximizers, there is every reason to assume that the agent won't "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Emilia Obińska-Wajda e new institutional economics -main theories always act in the principal's best interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) , which has to do with two problems that exist in that theory. The fi rst of these is the agency problem. It occurs when there is a confl ict between the agent's goals and the principal's desires and it's diffi cult or expensive for the principal to verify the agent's mode of operati on. The main principal's problem is to check if the agent acts in the principal's best interest (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58) .
The second one is the problem of risk sharing. It occurs when the both parti es perceive taking risks diff erently. The problem here is that both the principal and the agent can act in a diff erent way depending on their risk preferences and that is where Agency Theory is concerned with solving these problems (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58 ).
The way of solving the fi rst problem can be establishing appropriate incenti ves for the agent. If the agent has an opportunity to have a valuable gain, they do not want to act against the principal's interest, because it will not produce the expected profi t. The principal oft en resorts to incurring monitoring costs. The monitoring of the agent's acti ng should limit the aberrant acti viti es of the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Causing the agent to act on behalf of the principal is a very common problem. It exists in all organizati ons and cooperati ve-eff orts at each level of the management process (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ).
These are agency costs which result from the fi rst problem of Agency Theory. There are three sorts of agency costs: the principal's costs, the agent's costs and the alternati ve costs. The principal's costs involve monitoring the agent's acti ng. The second sort of the agency costs concern the agent's expenditures made to gain the principal's trust, e.g. insurance costs. These are also bonding costs which ensure that the principal will receive a compensati on if the agent does not act on the principal's behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . The third sort of agency costs are residual losses. These are the costs of the reducti on in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of the divergence between the agent's decisions and acti ons and the principal's interest (Gorynia, 1999; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
The principal and the agent have diff erent atti tudes towards risk. The risk aversion of the agent is understandable-the main agent's asset is their positi on: employment, contract or agreement. The agent is unable to diversify their positi on. The principal, who usually owns many assets, oft en represents an atti tude of risk-seeking (Urbanek, 2005, p. 100) . That problem can be observed in big organizati ons, where shareholders hire managers to manage their assets. The manager's behaviour is strictly connected with their job contract. If they have been employed to manage the company, they will not have to be focused on company profi t, because no matt er what, they will receive their grati fi cati on. However, if their contract is accompanied with a clause linking their grati fi cati on with the company's profi t, their behaviour will be completely diff erent.
Moral hazard, adverse selecti on and informati on asymmetry exist in Agency Theory.
Informati on asymmetry defi ned in this theory can be illustrated in the fact that the agent knows more than the principal about their own behaviour. The principal must bear the cost of monitoring and controlling to make sure that the agent acts on their behalf.
"Moral hazard refers to lack of eff ort on the part of the agent" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61) . This problem occurs when the agent is shirking. It means that one part of the relati onship (the agent) does not behave according the contract or agreement, so the agent acts in their own interest. For example, when a research scienti st works on a personal research project during their work ti me, but the project is so complicated that the principal (it may be a manager) cannot detect what a researcher is actually doing, then it is a moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61) .
Adverse selecti on relates to the misrepresentati on of the agent's abiliti es. The main problem in that case is the principal's inability to verify the agent's claims. The agent can state that they have the skills or abiliti es required to fulfi l the contract or agreement. Adverse selecti on arises because the principal cannot completely verify it (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61 ). This problem is common in how new employees are hired. During a job interview, an employer cannot verify all the skills and abiliti es, which, according to the CV submitt ed by the candidate, they are equipped with.
E
This secti on off ers six examples of empirical studies of Transacti on Costs, Property Rights Theory and Agency Theory. This part is a short review of practi cal studies which confi rm theoreti cal assumpti ons.
new institutional economics -main theories

Transaction Costs-vertical integration (Monteverde & Teece 1982; Masten 1984)
Verti cal integrati on (a make or buy decision), is regarded as a very important problem. According to Transacti on Costs Theory "the explanati on as to whether economic agents procure criti cal inputs and services through internal producti on or via market transacti ons is the role of asset specifi city" (Macher & Richman, 2008, p. 13 ).
Monteverde and Teece studied 133 automobile components. For each of them they ascertained the extent of verti cal integrati on by Ford and General Motors for American producti on in 1976 (Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 207) . They found that as component engineering development eff orts rose, so did the probability of inhouse producti on. Engineering development eff ort is understood as human capital, which creates lockin. "Transacti ons cost considerati ons surrounding the development and deepening of human skills appear to have important ramifi cati ons for verti cal integrati on in the automobile industry, thereby supporti ng the transacti ons cost paradigm advanced by Williamson" (Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 212) . The studies confi rmed that verti cal integrati on in General Motors and Ford is based at least in part on effi ciency assumpti on. This structure appears to take advantage of the ability of internal organizati onreducti on of an automakers' exposure for a risk of suppliers' opportunism; and the coordinati ng properti es of hierarchies (Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 212) .
Masten studied the aerospace industry, "constructi ng measures of specifi city and complexity for each input and fi nding that the combinati on of these two measures is especially important in explaining which inputs are produced in-house (Gibbons, 2010, p. 12) . He found that an asset specifi city has a signifi cant infl uence on the decision: make their own input or buy it from another producer. The characteristi c of components used in this industry gives an answer to the questi on of whether to make or buy. The more complex and specialized components are, the higher the probability of producing them internally.
Property Rights eory-building of a welfare state (De Soto, 2001)
De Soto focused in his studies on underdeveloped countries. He shows that in many of those countries property rights are not regulated. He pointed out that, for example, in Haiti 68% of city-dwellers and 97% of people in the countryside live in houses "to which nobody has clear legal ti tle" (De Soto, 2001, p. 30) . In this country the value of unti tled rural and urban real-estate holdings is worth 5.2 billion dollars. He also menti oned examples of Peru or the Philippines. De Soto pointed out that unregulated property rights in less developed countries obstructed the way houses were administrated. Lack of legal ti tles of ownership and problems with legalizati on of informal property rights has caused the bargaining power of citi zens to grow very weak, especially to banks. Because of the country's problem related to property rights, a lot of enterprising citi zens couldn't mortgage their houses to take a loan. It caused problems with development of the whole country (Zalesko, 2013, p. 98) .
Property Rights eory-economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001)
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson also studied property rights and they pointed out that they are very important for economic development. As they wrote "countries with bett er "insti tuti ons," more secure property rights, and less distorti onary policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and will use these factors more effi ciently to achieve a greater level of income" (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001 , p. 1369 . They studied diff erent types of European colonizati on policies. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson pointed out that European colonizers implemented diff erent policies in Africa, Lati n America and Australia or the United States. This created diff erent sets of insti tuti ons in those new countries. Belgian colonizati on of the Congo is an example of an extracti ve one-the main purpose of the colonizati on was about as much transfer of resources from the colony to the colonizer as it was possible. It caused colonizers to lose their interest in protecti on of property rights or preventi on of government expropriati on. A completely diff erent policy was followed in Australia or the United States." The sett lers tried to replicate European insti tuti ons, with strong emphasis on private property and checks against government power" (Acemoglu, Johnson "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. Walkling and Long studied the resistance of managers to takeover bids. Data for their research "were sought on all cash tender off ers fi led with the Securiti es and Exchange Commission during the 1972-1977 period" (Walkling & Long, 1984) . Resistance to takeover bids may be in the interest of managers. Because of a takeover they can lose their jobs. The situati on is unlike the one stockholders would expect-in general, resistance to a takeover bid isn't in their interest. This research confi rmed that if the managers have a lot of company equity (an outcome-based contract), they will not resist takeover bids. These results are consistent with Agency Theory: outcome-based contracts such as executi ve stock holdings are the miti gati on of agency problems which exist between shareholders and top executi ves in the situati on of diff erent interests.
Agency eory-commission and salary compensation of salespeople in retailing (Eisenhardt, 1995 (Eisenhardt, , 1988 Eisenhardt focused her research on the choice between commission and salary compensati on of sellers in 54 retail stores. A commission compensati on is an outcome-based contract and a salary compensati on is a behaviour-based contract. The research from 1985 included only agency variables but a later one was widened by "additi onal agency variables and insti tuti onal theory predicti ons" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 69) . According to the results of that research, task programmability and outcome measurability signifi cantly predict the choice between the salary and commission compensati on. Agency Theory predicti ons assume that task programmability is negati vely connected with outcome-based contracts and positi vely related to behaviour-based contracts. It is easier to observe a seller who is engaged in more programmed work than an entrepreneur in very programmed jobs to reveal behaviour of the employees. Outcome measurability is negati vely connected with behaviourbased contracts and positi vely related to outcome-based contracts. So the outcome-based contracts are more att racti ve when outcome is easy to measure. It is not always a simple task, because some tasks require team eff ort or ti me for preparing and executi ng them.
C
The New Insti tuti onal Economics is, as it has been illustrated, a highly diverse fi eld. It has many branches, which are rich in theoreti cal insight. Those branches have an infl uence on policy-making and they are also empirically useful. This arti cle covers the fundamentals of Agency Theory, Transacti on Costs Theory and Property Rights Theory.
The literature concerns the New Insti tuti onal Economics and its main theories that are rapidly expanding. These theories are gaining more adherents. Agency Theory, Transacti on Costs Theory and Property Rights Theory are applied to many fi elds of our life, such as: economics, politi cal science, law, strategy, sociology, growth and development, and history, which is why it is worth knowing their main assumpti ons.
The second part of this arti cle points out some selected examples of studies which concerns Agency Theory, Transacti on Costs Theory and Property Rights Theory. As it was shown, the New Insti tuti onal Economics and its main theories aren't only theoreti cal assumpti ons. The conclusions which can be drawn are of great practi cal signifi cance.
